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The January 2019 ruling of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in Solicitors Regu-
lation Authority v Sharif1 highlighted the care that legal practitioners must take in 
order to satisfy their anti-money laundering obligations and the serious conse-
quences of any failure to do so. This is the subject of a separate note in this issue 
of the Denning Law Journal.2 However, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
applied the criminal standard of proof in the case. The question as to whether this 
is now the appropriate approach is the subject of this note.
SOLICITORS AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF AT 
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
The current framework for dealing with disciplinary matters involving solicitors is 
as follows. In the case of less serious allegations, the Solicitors Regulation Author-
ity (SRA) enjoys its own disciplinary powers and can impose a range of adminis-
trative penalties. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal acts as an appellate body. 
Where its powers are considered insufficient, the SRA brings the case to the Solic-
itors Disciplinary Tribunal. Thus, the Tribunal acts as the first instance deci-
sion-maker in cases involving the most serious allegations relating to alleged 
professional misconduct against individual solicitors and firms. The Tribunal has 
wide sanctioning powers including issuing a reprimand, imposing an unlimited 
fine or ordering the removal of an individual solicitor from practice. Given the 
serious nature of the allegations against Mr Sharif concerning the failure to 
comply with his anti-money laundering obligations, the SRA brought the case to 
the Tribunal.
As regards the standard of proof in disciplinary cases involving solicitors, 
there is a ‘mixed’ approach. In cases heard and determined by the SRA, the civil 
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standard of proof (balance of probabilities) is applied. As regards the Tribunal, 
section 46 of the Solicitors Act 1974 provides it with a wide discretion to regulate 
its own procedure. The longstanding position of the Law Society of England and 
Wales (the Law Society) is that the Tribunal should apply the criminal standard of 
proof (beyond reasonable doubt), a key reason for doing so being the ‘significant 
impact that adverse decisions can have on individuals subject to tribunal 
proceedings’.3 Accordingly, the Tribunal ruled that the SRA was required to 
prove the allegations against Mr Sharif beyond reasonable doubt.4
This mixed approach can lead to a curious situation as illustrated by the case 
of Solicitors Regulation Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.5 Here 
Huseyin Arslan was the subject of disciplinary proceedings before the SRA. 
Applying the civil standard of proof, the SRA adjudicator found allegations of 
misconduct proved against Mr Arslan and ordered that a sanction be imposed. Mr 
Arslan then applied to the Tribunal for a review of the decision of the adjudicator. 
In considering the matter, the Tribunal applied the criminal standard of proof and 
on the facts revoked the order.
In the High Court, the SRA sought to challenge the ruling of the Tribunal, 
arguing, inter alia, that ‘the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the criminal 
standard of proof should be applied’.6 Leggatt J agreed with this submission. The 
court was then invited to give an opinion on the standard of proof to be applied by 
the Tribunal when acting as a first instance decision-maker. Leggatt J noted that 
‘the climate and approach to professional regulation’7 had changed since the 
High Court decision In Re A Solicitor8 and the Privy Council decision in 
Campbell v Hamlet (Trinidad and Tobago).9 In the former, Lord Lane in the 
Divisional Court held that the criminal standard was applicable where ‘what is 
alleged is tantamount to a criminal offence’.10 In Campbell, a case also involving 
a legal practitioner, the Privy Council went further and held that ‘the criminal 
3 The Law Society, ‘The Standard of Proof Applied by the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal’ (The Law Society, 2017) <https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/documents/
standard-of-proof-discussion-paper/> accessed 10 June 2019, para 2.3.
4 Ibid., para 12.
5 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal [2016] EWHC 2862 
(Admin).
6 Ibid., para 23.
7 Ibid., para 49.
8 In Re A Solicitor [1993] QB 69.
9 Campbell v Hamlet (Trinidad and Tobago) [2005] UKPC 19.
10 Re A Solicitor (n 9) para 81.
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standard of proof is the correct standard to be applied in all disciplinary 
proceedings concerning the legal profession …’.11
Leggatt J considered these decisions were ‘ripe for re-consideration’12 but 
declined the invitation to express a concluded view of the point in the instant case. 
Sir Brian Leveson agreed with this approach but underlined the need for ‘a 
re-evaluation of the approach to disciplinary measures intended to protect the 
public’.13 On the facts, the High Court quashed the decision of the Tribunal.
NEED FOR A CHANGE?
The standard of proof used at disciplinary proceedings of professional bodies has 
been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years with a clear trend being 
towards the adoption of the civil standard. For example, the Medical Practitioners 
Tribunal Service, which is a statutory committee of the General Medical Council, 
has adopted the civil standard of proof where there are any disputed facts in disci-
plinary proceedings against medical practitioners.14 Perhaps more significant is 
the position of the Bar Standards Board (BSB). In 2017, the BSB issued a consul-
tation paper entitled ‘Review of the Standard of Proof Applied in Professional 
Misconduct Proceedings’15 in which it requested views from the profession and 
the public on the appropriate standard of proof in misconduct proceedings. At that 
time, the position was similar to disciplinary matters involving solicitors. Thus the 
BSB’s Professional Conduct Committee was empowered to deal with potential 
breaches of the BSB Handbook by way of administrative sanctions, the applicable 
standard of proof being the civil standard. In more serious cases, the matter was 
referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal which applied the ‘criminal standard of proof 
when deciding charges of professional misconduct and in deciding whether the 
disqualification condition has been established’.16
11 Campbell v Hamlet (Trinidad and Tobago) (n 10) para 16.
12 Ibid., para 49.
13 Ibid., para 73.
14 See Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service, ‘Resource for Doctors: Medical 
Practitioners Tribunals’ (MPTS, 2019) <https://www.mpts-uk.org/-/media/mpts-documents/ 
dc11585-resource-for-doctors-medical-practitioners-tribunals_pdf-76539010.pdf> 
accessed 15 April 2019, p 4.
15 Bar Standards Board, ‘Review of the Standard of Proof Applied in Professional 
Misconduct Proceedings: Consultation Paper’ (Bar Standards Board, May 2017) <https://
www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1830289/sop_consultation_paper.pdf> accessed 
15 April 2019.
16 Disciplinary Tribunal Regulations 2014, Regulation E143.
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Following the consultation, the BSB issued a response that carefully reviewed 
the issue of the appropriate standard of proof. The BSB concluded that:
Overall, we take the view, as expressed by some in favour of change, that it is 
self-evident that the civil standard provides better public protection given that 
it allows for sanctions to be imposed where it is more likely than not there has 
been a serious breach of an individual’s professional obligations. In principle, 
it seems difficult to argue against this without a clear justification for saying 
that the criminal standard provides better protection. We do not consider that 
such a clear justification exists.17
In November 2017, the BSB announced that it had decided to change the 
standard of proof in all cases to the civil standard with the Chair of the BSB 
noting that this would be ‘an important step forward in the BSB’s ongoing work to 
modernise the regulation of the Bar in the public interest’18 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, as from 1 April 2019 the BSB applies the civil standard of proof 
rather than the criminal standard in cases where barristers, and others regulated 
by the BSB, face disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct.19
In 2017, the Law Society issued its own consultation paper20 seeking the 
views of solicitors on the subject. It recognised there was an inherent difficulty in 
classifying disciplinary proceedings as being civil or criminal in nature and noted 
17 Bar Standards Board, ‘BSB Standard of Proof Consultation – BSB Response’ (Bar 
Standards Board, July 2017) <https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1923922/
standard_of_proof_consultation_-_bsb_response_-_final.pdf> accessed 15 April 2019, 
para 38.
18 Bar Standards Board, ‘Civil Standard of Proof Set to be Adopted for Professional 
Misconduct Proceedings for Barristers’ (Bar Standards Board, 24 November 2017) 
<https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media-centre/press-releases-and-news/civil-
standard-of-proof-set-to-be-adopted-for-professional-misconduct-proceedings-for-
barristers/> accessed 10 June 2019.
19 Somewhat confusingly in the case of veterinary surgeons, the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons Disciplinary Committee Procedure Guidance states that the standard 
of proof to be applied by the Disciplinary Committee is that specified in the (Procedure 
and Evidence Rules) Order of Council 2004. See Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, 
‘Disciplinary Committee Procedure Guidance’ (RCVS, 27 September 2013) <https://
www.rcvs.org.uk/document-library/disciplinary-committee-procedure-guidance/> 
accessed 10 June 2019, para 13: ‘The standard [of proof] is that the Disciplinary Committee 
should be “satisfied to the highest civil standard of proof, so that it is sure” (which is 
tantamount to applying the “criminal standard”)’ (emphasis in the original).
20 The Law Society (n 4).
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that the European Court of Justice has viewed such proceedings as being of a 
hybrid nature.21 Indeed, in the consultation paper, the Law Society not only 
explored the arguments for and against the criminal and the civil standard but also 
noted possible ‘hybrid’ options. One option based on the American Bar Association 
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement was to introduce an 
intermediate standard, i.e. requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence’.22 The use of 
a ‘sliding scale approach’23 was also noted. This is used by several international 
sports disciplinary bodies and provides for a flexible approach to the standard of 
proof depending on the seriousness of the allegation.24
In the event, the result of the consultation was that 90% of solicitors responding 
were in favour of maintaining the status quo and this remains the position.
TOWARDS A COMMON APPROACH TO THE STANDARD 
OF PROOF?
Given that the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings of other professional 
bodies is overwhelmingly the civil standard, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
is placed in an anomalous position. As Leggatt J noted in Solicitors Regulation 
Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ‘the present situation in which the 
Tribunal, when acting as a primary fact-finder applies a different standard of proof 
from that which the SRA applies when carrying out that role is unsatisfactory and 
illogical’.25 Given its wide-ranging disciplinary powers there is rightly concern 
over the need to ensure a suitably high standard of proof in cases where there is an 
allegation of criminal conduct or where a solicitor’s livelihood is at stake. However, 
21 Albert and Le Compte v Belgium [1983] 5 EHRR 533.
22 An intermediate standard has been favoured by several courts in the Commonwealth 
when considering the appropriate standard of proof in election petition cases: see in 
particular the Supreme Court of Kenya decision in Odinga v Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission [2017] eKLR. See also the discussion in John Hatchard, ‘Election 
Petitions and the Standard of Proof’ (2015) 27 Denning Law Journal 291.
23 The Law Society (n 4) para 2.5.
24 For example, Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the International Association of 
Athletics Federations’ Ethics Commission provides that ‘The standard of proof in all 
cases shall be determined on a sliding scale from, at minimum, a mere balance of 
probability (for the least serious violation) up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt (for the 
most serious violation). The Panel shall determine the applicable standard of proof in each 
case’. See International Association of Athletics Federations, ‘Code of Ethics’ 
(IAAF, January 2015) <https://www.iaafethicsboard.org/Content/downloads/IAAF-
Code-of-Ethics-eng.pdf> accessed 10 June 2019.
25 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (n 6) para 49.
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arguably, even in such cases, this does not require the adoption of the criminal 
standard. The views expressed in the Arslan case (noted earlier) that the ‘climate 
and approach to professional regulation has changed’26 and that there is a need for 
‘a re-evaluation of the approach to disciplinary measures intended to protect the 
public’27 emphasise the point. Further, in the Sharif case itself, the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal emphasised that ‘maintaining public confidence in the 
profession remains of paramount importance’.28 The failure of Mr Sharif to comply 
with his anti-money laundering obligations highlights the concern.
Given these strong statements, it is difficult to justify the retention of the 
criminal standard of proof in disciplinary cases before the Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal. The solution does not lie in the adoption of an intermediate standard. 
Instead, while emphasising that there is a single civil standard of proof, the English 
courts have supported a ‘flexible’ application of that standard. Thus in In re CD 
(Original Respondent and Cross-appellant) (Northern Ireland)29 Lord Carswell 
opined that the proposition neatly expressed by Richards LJ in R (N) v Mental 
Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region)30 ‘effectively states in concise terms 
the proper state of the law on this topic’:31
Although there is a single civil standard of proof on the balance of 
probabilities, it is flexible in its application. In particular, the more serious 
the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation is 
proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the 
allegation proved on the balance of probabilities. Thus the flexibility of the 
standard lies not in any adjustment to the degree of probability required for 
an allegation to be proved (such that a more serious allegation has to be 
proved to a higher degree of probability), but in the strength or quality of the 
evidence that will in practice be required for an allegation to be proved on 
the balance of probabilities.32
26 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (n 6) para 49.
27 Ibid., para 73.
28 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 2) para 29.
29 In re CD (Original Respondent and Cross-appellant) (Northern Ireland) [2008] UKHL 
33.
30 R (N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) [2005] EWCA Civ 1605, 
para 62.
31 In re CD (Original Respondent and Cross-appellant) (Northern Ireland) (n 30) 
para 27.
32 Ibid.
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Lord Carswell further noted ‘that in some contexts a court or tribunal has to 
look at the facts more critically or more anxiously than in others before it can be 
satisfied to the requisite standard…’.33 Thus situations ‘which make such 
heightened examination necessary may be the inherent unlikelihood of the 
occurrence taking place…, the seriousness of the allegation to be proved or, in 
some cases, the consequences which could follow from acceptance of proof of the 
relevant fact’.34
This is surely the correct approach. Thus in cases before both the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority and the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the civil standard 
of proof should be applied. However in cases before the Tribunal in which there 
are very serious allegations of misconduct which, if proved, could subject the 
solicitor to the possibility of an unlimited fine or removal from practice, the 
Tribunal must require more cogent evidence to support the allegations. This would 
protect both the public interest and the interest of the individual solicitor.
It is now up to the Law Society to follow the lead of the Bar Standards Board.
33 Ibid., para 28.
34 Ibid. Lord Carswell gave a useful illustration which might also apply to the position of 
a solicitor: ‘The seriousness of consequences is another facet of the same proposition: if it 
is alleged that a bank manager has committed a minor peculation, that could entail very 
serious consequences for his career, so making it the less likely that he would risk doing 
such a thing’: Ibid. See also the views of the Privy Council in Hearing on the Report of the 
Chief Justice of Gibraltar [2009] UKPC 43 esp pp 15–17.
